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The EEC and the Consumer Miceal Ross, ESRI.
In my approach to the topic I wish to be somewhat more general
than merely considering the aspect of food prices although I intend to give these
special attention. My comments must necessarily be brief and in many cases
tentative as I am currently engaged in a steady of the impact of the EEC on Ireland)
both North and South. In making this study I have had the support of the Committee
for Social Research in Ireland whose offices are located here in Belfast.
My first point is to restate that a consumer is generally a producer
viewed from a specific aspect. The producer’s concern is to obtain income and
the consumers to get the most value from this income. In a period of inflation the
consumer’s standard of living will rise if the general price rise is slower than the
rise in his income as a producer. In the Republic this has been true for large
segments of the population though inevitably there have been the usual, victims of
inflation - frequently pensioners and lenders. Any consideration of the EEC’s impact
on the consumer must be supplemented by an investigation of the Community’s impact
on the income which he or she has to spend and this is something to which I hope to
return briefly later on.
Causes of Inflation - The Theory
Given his income the consumer is concerned about inflation. The
next question, then, is "How has the EEC affected inflation" ? The answer is
complex and is not yet fully worked out. However it is worth examining the causes
of inflation. The first point to be noted here is that the high levels of inflation
experienced for more than a decade appeared as a world wide phenomenon in the
late sixties and with them a revision of the theory of inflation was called for and
produced. The previous theory centred on the nation state and sought to ex2~lain
inflation in terms of a trade off between price increases and levels of unemployment -
the Phillips curve. The new emphasis noted that, although these trade offs differed
oin modern industrial countries, all had begun to move in the same direction
simultaneously. The new explanation found the cause to be excess demand begun
by US fiscal policy in 1967 which was exported to other industrial countries. (The
US validated the excess domestic demand by an inordinate expansion of the money
supply which increased by over 50 per cent between 1968 and 1973, see Ryan 1974:).
The continuous experience of excess demand created inflation expectations which,
combined with the excess demand," produced the inflation rates experienced especially
since 1969. This hypothesis was shown to be substantially correct by analyses in
the US, Canada, and withmodifications in the UK (see Parkin 1974). The end of
the sixties was also a period in which the prices of raw materials and primary
products had started to move up in international trade, which would add to the
import bills of industrial countries, especially those with weak currencies, and
open to world trade. Two such countries would be the UK and Ireland.
Small Open Economies
As an extension of this theory the case of small open economies
operating under a fixed exchange rate was studied and such insights into l:he situation
of the Republic were summarised in a series of papers of which those by Geary
(1974), Ryan (1974), Moore McDowell (1.975) and Kennedy and Vmlghan (1979) are
the most significant. The first three cover a common ground which states thateexcept
in the very short run,such economies canno~ have an inflation rate that deviates from
that of their major trading partners and at the same time maintain their fixed exchange
rate. The mechanisms by which the convergence occurs are best illustrated by
Geary (1974) following an analysis by Caves (1973). Kennedy (1974), however,
challenged this statement as potentially dangerous if it led to the belief that nothing
could be done about inflation and noted that short run deviations on the right side could
be tremendously important for trade. He also noted that the explanation was
simplistic and lacked detailed knowledge of mm~y other factors with an important
bearing on inflation, Such as the non.traded goods sector. The mechanism of
6transmission were also largely unknown and unquantified. McCarthy (1980) has
graphed the parallel development of inflation in the Republic and the United Kingdom
between 1960 and up to the end of the fixed exchange rate regime with the UK. The
concordance is impressive as Figure 1 shows. However, as KeL~nedy has noted,* the
fit is too good as it allows nothing for Ireland’s other trading partners and the close
agreement reflects the high level of J.nstitutional and cultural similarity between the
two countries.
An Empirical Test
In the development of the Central Bank model for the Repub!ic
McCarthy (1976) found that 93% of the variation in domestic consumer prices (net
of taxes and subsidies) could be explained in terms of changes in import prices in
the previous and current years and in terms of changes in export prices. Changes in
export prices, in turn ¯could be explained again in terms of changes in import prices
in the previous and current years plus changes in farm prices. Changes in unit
labour cost also entered the equation but their contribution was minute and the
coefficient was not statistically significant. In this case over 94% of the variation
was accounted for. It is possible to Substitute the results for export prices into the
general prices equation and obtain a new equation in which changes in domestic
prices, net of taxes and subsidies, are seen to be related to changes in import and
farm prices with a minor influence from trait labour costs. All three equations are
given in an appendix for the mathematically minded.
Using this new equation we can estimate the contribution of each
element to the general change in prices. This contribution will depend both on the
size of the coefficient and the magnitude of the price change. The infl(mnce of a
percentage change in farm prices in general would be about a quarl:er that of a
similar change in import prices. In absolute terms an increase of one per cent in
farm prices will lead to a p.rice rise of 0. 176% whereas a rise in unit labour cost
would have only one seventh this impact - as determined by McCarthy’s equation.
* Kennedy personal communication
,t
As Kennedy and also I~irkan have argued the policy implications are no_.t that unit
labour costs are unimportant - quite the contrary. They determine the level of
employment/and unemployment rather than that of prices. Judging by Table 1 which
admittedly extends beyond the period analysed by McCarthy, import prices would
appear to have had four times the import of domestic farm prices.
Table I: Changes in the Consumer Price Index (net of taxes and subsidies)
and the contribution of price changes for imports, farm products and
unit labour costs in the Republic of Ireland 196
Previous Year Consumer Import Farmer Prices Unit Labour Costs
compared with Price Prices
1967 3.4 -. 01 .36 .04
1968 4.4 2.25 1.80 .04
1969 6.2 4.11 .50 .20
1970 6.9 3.57 .81 .30
1971 8.8 5.00 1.23 .25
1972 9.3 4.37 3.78 .27
1973 13.0 5.59 5.40 .27
1974 17.6 17.96 .07 .46
1975 23.1 22.09 4.79 . 73
1976 17.9 13.05 4.29 . 47
1977 14.6 11.81 3.87 .37
Note: The last three observations are extrapolations beyond the range of
McCarthy’s analysis.
Import Price Rises
If import prices are a dominant element it is important to know what
causes them to rise. Just under half (49.4%) of Irish imports in 1978 came from
the UK. It would be useful to knowthe factors determining British export prices
to see what impact, if any, EEC farm prices had on these but in the time at my
disposal I Was not able to find any equations that would enable such an analysis to
be done. Given the degree of openness of the UK economy, import prices would
play an important role and here two significant ’el.ements ~vould be’the rise in price
of raw matel;ials and primary p~oducts and the exchange rate. In the case of tha~
.half of Irish imports not coming from tile UK tile exchange rate would not be
%
fixed and changes in the other rates vis-a-vis sterling would be a significant
factor.
Exchange Rates
For these reasons it would be instructive to look at the movement of
sterling, to which the Irish punt was linked until recently, over the last two
decades. For comparison other EEC currencies and the US dollar are also
given in Table 2 and the comparisons based on the EUA (European Unit of Account)
as set out in EEC statistics. 1967 was a year of deva].uation in sterling and
Danish Kroner; other currencies were fixed. By 1969 sterli~w, }lad begun to slide
and to a lesser extent the Danish Kroner. By 1973 - the year of accession,
Table II : Indices of movement in currency values relative to the EAU i967-1979
, UK/Ireland De,~rnark Italy France Belgium Netherlands Germany
1967 98.5 99.5 100.5 100.5 100.5 100.5 100.5
1969 89.7 96.4 104.7 99.8 104.7 104.7 "lOG. 3
1973 76.1 99.6 93.4 96.5 111.9 113.0 130.6
1976 61.4 109.3 71.9 98.9 123, 9 131.0 152.0
1979 59.1(57.1) 102.5 58.8 90.6 133,2 140,9 170,4
1973 = 100
1976 80.7 109.7 77.0 102.5 110.7
+
1979 77.7 (%.0)102.9 63.0 93.9 1.19.0
US
100.5
106.7
86.9
95.7
78.!
115.9 116.4 ii0. I
124.7 130.5 89.9
+ Irish punt
sterling had weakened considerably and also the US dollar. The Italian lira was
also slipping. The Deutschmark on the other hand had risen by as large a
proportion as sterling had fallen*. By 1979 the Irish punt had lost the most ground
foil owed by the Italian lira and sLerling. The US dollar had also dropped sharply.
]Relative to 1962 and to the Irish punt the Deutschmark had improved its position
threefold by 1979. The lower pal~ of the table also e)cpresses these changes
relative to 1973 and reveals Italy as having suffered the largest decline. When
* The EAU is an average of the currencies, so compensating movements are to be
expected.
0these exchange rates, or similar ones modified to account for internal
purchasing power, are applied to growth in per capita national income and
also in its general level, the UK, ItMy and Ireland are seen to have suffered
relative to 1973 and all other members to have gained. The first three
countries are all countries with considerable regional problems. The lower
levels of incomes in these countries mean that consumers there enjoy lower
standards of living relative to the EEC as a whole quite irrespective of general
price levels.
The table shows that prior to EEC entry the sterling exchange rate
had fallen substantially. Indeed the rate of decline in the six years preceding
membership was the same as that in the six years after membership. The
question can then be asked: What has been the cause of this exchange rate
decline and what steps if any can the EEC take to strengthen the ailing
economies ? An answer to these questions could benefit the consumer through
the impact on income and by halting inflation more than compensate for the
higher cost of food. However in the UK case some would argue that the malady
is itself caused by the drain on Britain of higher import prices for food and the
taxation levied to pay for surpluses. This is something to which we shMl have
to return.
Consumer Prices
]Exchange rates are of course lizH~ed to consumer prices and Table III
documents the experience with il~ation of the EEC countries. Compared with
Table III: Consumer Price Indices in the EEC 1967-1979 (3rd Quarter)
Ireland UK Denmark Italy France Belgium Netherlands GermanyIclbZ = Ioo
1967 122.4 118. i 129.2 126.0 118. I 118.4 124.6 113.4
1969 137.3 130.6 144.6 130.1 131.9 126.3 139.1 118.3
1973 197.0 177.8 189.2 168.5 166.7 155.0 182.6 145.1
1976 328.4 298.6 261.5 274.0 231.9 214.5 239. i 172.0
1979 III 463.5 439.4 358.7 422.6 311.7 252.2 279.3 192.7
1973 = i00
166.7 167.9 138.2 162.6 139.1 138.4 130.9 118.5
235.2 247.1 189.6 250.8 187.0 162.7 152.9 132.8
1976 = 100
141.1 147.2 137.2 154.2 134.4 117.6 116.8 112.0
oprice levels in 1962 the Irish¯ rate of inflation has been thehighest but compared
¯ ¯with 1973 the Italian and British rates have beer; l~.gher. When Ireland and Denmar]~
joined in 1973 their rates compared with 1962 were broadly similar, Subsequently
the Irish exchange rate fell by 25% while the Danish rate hardened slightly. The
rise in Irish prices was 100 percentage points higher. Up to 1976 the Danish Kroner
gained 10% and price rises were moderale. In the period after 1976 the fall in the
Irish and Danish exchange rates were broadly similar and internal price¯ rises not
very different. This is what you wolfl.d expect given that internal prices reflect
exchange rates and vice versa,
Agricultural Price Indices
To return to McCarthy’s equations for estimating price changes,
farm prices were noted to have an important impact though not as great as that of
import prices. However this can be cancelled bythe magnitude of the changes in
the price of farm produce.
EEC statistics provide a basis for comparison among European
countries and the general results on the basis of 1970 = i00 show that by the
second quarter of 1979 Irish producer prices had increased fourfold and at twice
the rate of Denmark which was also outside the EEC in 1.970. UK prices had
increased .threefold. The main divergence between Irish and UK rates of change
occurred ’after 1976 and may be related to differential devaluations of the green
pound. Italian prices had increased slightly more than those for the UK even though
Italy was one of the original founder members of the Community. France was also
an original member yet price changes moved in line with those of Denmark i. e. ; they
doubled. Dutch and German prices only rose by a third and Belgian by a half. In
these countries the index was lower in the second quarter of 1979 compared with
1976, especially in Germany and the Netherlands. These c0~ntriesgenerally had~
no price rises due to alignment and the experience, suggests that once adjustment has
occurred downward pressure on prices can be expected on Irish and British prices
unless these are avoided by a deterioration in. the exchange rate.
Table IV: Producer Price Indices for Agriculture for EEC countries 1972-1979
1970 = 100
lreland ¯ UK Denmark Italy France Belgium Netherlands Germany
1972 129.9 113.4 113.6 115.6 118.0 106.7 108.8 120.9
1973 169.8 146.3 149.2 145.4 131.9 121.5 121.5 121.0
1974 172.2 165.8 150.0 160.9 135.6 114.4 114.9 121.8
1975 207.3 203.5 161.3 187.0 145.9 135.6 129.7 130.8
1976 ¯262.2 269.2 181.8 231.9 169.1 152.4 146.6 147.7
1977 321.1 269.0 190.3 263.1 174.9 147.0 142.2 139.0
1978 362.6 278.0 200.5 285.4 185.0 142.1 138.0 136.9
1979 II 404.9 306.3 201.6 307.8 200.0 151.9 138..8 135.2
Some reasons for the different experiences of different countries
could be differences in the composition of agricultural output in the different
eomltries. Another would be the differences in the !evel of prices in the base year.
One wouId have expected a priori, that Irish and Danish price levels and the
composition of output to have been broadly similar in 1970 yet Irish prices rose
¯ twice as fast as Danish. It should be noted in passing that prices were exceptionally
high in Irelm~d in the second quarter of 1 979. ]By September they had fallen by
9.3% whereas Danish prices r0se 1%. Adjustment on this account would not change
the argument greatly.
Factors Influencing Farm Prices
What are the factors influencing Irish farm prices ? Here we must
distingxfish between products which fall within the remit of the Common Agricultural
Policy and those which do not. Lamb, potatoes, oats, milk for liquid consumption
are examples of the latter. Another distinction would be those products that were
maintained at a higher level of price in Ireland before¯ accession than was the
generally prevailing price in the EEC (at least in terms of EAU prices). \~rneat
mid sugar wouldbe examples of such prochmts. Again one would have expected
that in general British prices, even allowing for deficiency payments, would have
been lower than those supported In Ireland and therefore the rate of prices increase
greater but as Table lVshows tlfis was not so.
oTurning now to those products to which the Common Agricultural Policy
applies we find a variety of mechanisms to support prices - intervention buying
and adjustable exte~n~.al tariffs. These devices gl.larantee a minimum price to
fanners but if worId marketing conditions so dictate the actual price realised can
be much higher. This seems to have been the situation with cattle in 1972 and 1973.
An index of the weighted unit price of cattle corrected for the rise in the consumer
price index shows this outcome:
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
100     98    100 121    136 101    103 119    130 138
These figures show the rise in cattle prices above the current rate of inflation.
The high 1973 price level was followed by a collapse in cattle prices in 1974 in
spite of EEC membership. The prices also relate to gross receipts and are not
adjusted for movements in costs, such as.thefertiliser price trebling following the
oil crisis. A comparison of unit values in real terms between 1973 and 1977 shows
that many products experienced real price falls while others i~.creased. (As I
mentioned before, sheep and potatoes are not CAP products).
Cattle - 5 Milk + 22
Sheep - 19 Cereals + 2
Pigs - 1 Potatoes + 12
Poultry - 10 Sugar Beet + 41
Eggs - 25
~egional Incomes
As a consequence of these changes the regional developmcnt of total
agricultural income in the Republic has been disparate. The West region had a
fall Of -4.9 per cent in real income and the MidIm~ds of -1.4 per cent compared
to a gain Of 15.3 per cent in the rich dairying area of the Soui~ .~rest. High prices and
the expectation of continuing il]flation has put the purchase of land beyond the
reach of the industrious up-and-coming young farl~ers and made the urgent problem
of structural improvement Well nigh impossible. Whatever about the interests
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of the consumer, it would be useful to ascertainhow much the farmer has benefited
in real terms. It could be a lot less than is generally supposed.
At the time of accession Ireland e~ected to gain for certain major
products from the transitional adjustments to be completed by 1 January 1978 and
by the annual price reviews of the EEC; Price rises due to currency depreciation
/
were no~ foreseen. No forecasts were published anticipating the impact of EEC
pricesoil food prices, unlike in Britain where the price increases for ]~odd were
reckoned to be 16 per cent. Incidentally, the Cambridge Economic Policy group,
opposing EEC membership, have calculated that the food price rise net of inflation
was 12 per cent.
Canwe now disentangle the three elements of the farm price rise?
¯ Some typical results for major commodities are as follows:
Alignment Annual Price Increases Both
1973 to Jan 1 1978
Butter + 20% + 24% + 49%
Beef & Veal + 28% + 58% +103%
~rheat + 6% + 13% + 22%
Barley + 18% + 26% + 48%
Green Pound
devaluations
to May 1.978
+ 70%
Total
+154%
+246%
+108%
+152%
In the case of the I~epublic the alignment steps were generally not as large as the
impact of armuaI price increases over the period of alignment. At the same time
the increases due to green pound devaluations were much greater thm~ either.
In the case of the UK the alignment amounts were greater whereas the green pound
.devaluation was lower in the same period, 44.5 per cent. The ammal price increases
were the same for both countries. By following a slower green pound devaluation
the UK was able to cushion the effect on the consumer in a way which Maclennan (1978)
Minister for Consumer Affairs in the Labour Government acknowledged was not
anticipated. This may have been necessary given that the alignment steps were
+ 144 per cent for butter, 56 per cent for Wheat, and 60 per cent for barley. Since
the Republic had been operating a system Of price supports already before accession,
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the transition, was easier eu the Irish consumer and would have been a lot lighter
had the serious level of inflation been avoided. *
.Impact of Farm Prices on Food Prices
Sheehy, on two separate occasion%attempted to estimate the impact
of the EEC on consumer prices in the Republic. Both exercises were at the behest
of the National Prices Commission. In the first instance, Sheehy (1974) examined
the 5 per cent across the board increase in all EEC support prices introduced on
2 October 1974, which was coupled with an 11.1 per cent devaluation of the Irish green
pound. Sheehy noted that some products were not under CAP - lamb, potatoes,
soft drinks and half the food imports including beverages and certain fruits. Others
were selling on the open market at prices above the support prices -. poultry, eggs,
vegetables, fish and most of the remaining food import. Similar considerations
applied to wheat, feed grains and sugar. The products directly affected were milk,
dairy products, beef and p[gmeat. Allowing for the weightings in the Consumer
Price index, the total direct impact on food prices Sheehy calculated to be i per Ce:nt.
Clearly this apparent increase of 16.7 per cent would have had a larger impact had
there been a weaker market for some commodities such as poultry and pigmeat.
Sheehy went on to calculate the income gains to farmers which netted £71.8 milHor..
This increase was derived by £15.1 million extra paid by Irish consumers and £54.4
millions from foreigu~ers~or a £3.6 gain to the country in foreign exchange for
every £1 extra paid by Irish consumers. This is a point to which we shall return.
Sheehy (:~978) carried out his second exercise at th.e end of the alignment
period, i.e., 1 January 1978. He noted that whereas the consumer price in general
had risen 111 per cent between 1972 and 1977, the food index had risen by 120 per -
cent. Food had risen faster than general prices butnot so much faster as-was
widely believed. This comparison, however, ignores the rise in food prices in 1971
~’.This was avoided to some extent by a lesser devaluation of the green pomld thm~ the
actual market exchange rate warranted.
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mud 1972 which, to some extent, was in anticipation of accession. Comparing
February 1971 with February 1978 would have shown food at 266 compared with
a general index of 248 or, put more starkly, assuming food was 30 per cent of the
total index, a non-food index of 240. As Sheehy notes the index would have been
higher but for the removal of VAT on food and the considerable increase in food
subsidies. These subsidies are now being phased out. Given the absence of
signlificant direct faluner taxation, the brunt of the subsidies has come from outside
the agricultural sector.
Using the 1972.-1977 comparison, Sheehy decomposed retail food prices
as follows:
Decomposition of retail food price increases, 1972 to 1977
Weighting Increase in Chm]ge at % of
Sector in food Sector Retail Total
chain 197’7 over 1972 1977 over 1972
% points
Pre-farm 0. 176 160.5 28.25 19.6
Farm 0. 264 134.7 35.55 24.7
Import 0. 110 226.0 24.86 ,17.3
Yiarketing 0,450 122.8 55.24 38.4
Total-
unadjusted 1.O00 143.9 143,9 100.0
Subsidy
adjustment - - 14.1 -
VAT adjustment - - -9.8 -
Total - - ]. 20 -
Source: National Prices Commission 1Vionthly Report No. 70, p. 71, February 1978
"Pre-farm" represents farm inputs. Fertiliser prices had trebled between 1972
I
and 1977 and feed prices were almost as bad. Petrol was also greatly increased
as were machinery prices (largely imported). 30 per cent of the import bill was
made up of feed inputs and here membership of the EEC undoubtedly played a
significant r61e in the price rise as the source of supplies was diverted-fo Europe.
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"]?ann" refers to Irish farmers’ output prices. Creamery milk had trebled in
price but cattle prices were up 138 per cent. Here again cattle prices were moving
strongly upwards in 1972 and the actual increase is masked somewhat in Sheehy’s
estimates. Eggs were up by less thm~ 86 per cent.
"Imports" relate to food imports - 19.1 per cent of food was foreign
origin in 1972 compared wifh 23.3 per cent in 1976. Sheehy did not determine how
much of fl~ese imports was of EEC origin and whether such supplies were replacing
cheaper sources elsewhere. Some of the imports were of non-EEC products:
tropical fruit, tea, coffee, etc. Sheehy notes that coffee was at the time of calculation
in short supply inten~ationally. This observation was irrelevant given the weighti.t]g
of coffee in new 1975 index:- 0. 087 per cent. Given the very substantial rise i.n all
import prices, it could be useful to trace the source of these price increases as
between EEC and other.
"h~[arketing" refers to the margin of the food price due lJo processing
and retailing. Here the increase was the least, reflecting the impact of the
supermarket chains, part of whose profits were passed on to the consumer in lower
prices.
All four sources of price change would have increased retail food prices
by 144 per cent (as against 97 per cent for a probable non-food index) were it not
for the removal of VAT from food and substantial food subsidies. It will be noted
that all along the chain from the input producer to the retailer, import prices have
a significant effect. Here again the weakness of the currency must have played a
considerable role. This factor aggravated the influence of EEC farm protection.
R edis tributional A s~ ec ts
¯ -
In discussions of food prices it is usual to refer to the differential impact
on different income groups and in Britain it is widely believed that the poor have
fared particularly badly. There are two aspects tO this question. First, the
absolute share of income spent on food and second, whether inflation rates have
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been higher for lower income groups. It is a well-.known property of Lhag’eis Law
that as incomes rise expenditure on food rises less than proportionately m~d this is
borne out by the results of the Household Budget Inquiry. However, what is not so
well-known is that the index of price change for poor households for all items does
not differ greatly from that of other income groups. This was first demor~strated
by Kennedy and Bruton (1975) who showed that between 1968 and 1975 when prices
generally rose by more fl~an I00 per cent, the difference between the highest and
lowest increases was 2 per cent. This was not significant given the size of the
overall increase. The highest rise was in the poorest category but the lowest rise
was in tl]e second lowest income group. Irvine and 1VicCarthy (1977) re-analysed
the results based on a "true" cost of living index. Such m~ index allows for
substitution betw.een goods as relative prices change. Irvine and IvIcCarthy co~lcluded
that the inflation had produced a slight worsening of the relative positior, of higher
income groups. The same authors (1.978) later re.-analysed the results of a study
by Muellbauer (1974) which had claimed a 6 per cent worsening in the relative position
of the UK’s poorer consumers and found that this finding was not supported by their
results using true cost of living indices.
Impact of CAP on tl]e Republic
To revert to the impact of the CAP on the Irish consumer the most
developed ar~alysis has been that of Attwood (1979) which was based on Input-Outpul:
tables constructed by E. Henry. Attwood’s analysis considered the benefits of CAP
under four headings: (1) the economy as a whole; (2) the agricultural sector;
(3) the non-agricultural productive sector; mid (4) consumers. Under the economy
as a whole Attwood made estimates of the gain to the balmlce of payments arising
from higher prices than those in world trade. While the figures in the calculation
are on the high side, for reasons given by Attwood, the GNP benefit in 1978 was
reckoned by him to be about 10 per cent.
Farmers I;hemselves gained little from the multiplier effects of their
er~9orts but gaii~ed about £57 millions from transfers from Irish consumers outside
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farming. However, had Ireland remained outside the EEC the Government would
have continued some measure of farm support to keep farmers’ incomes from
falling behind the 115 per cent growth in non-agricultural wages and salaries.
Such support would have been a lot more costly than £57 millions.
The cost to the non-agricultural seetor~given as £57 millionsjis net of
the savings arising from the shouldering of the cost of farm support by the EEC
rather than by Irish taxpayers. The benefits to the sector come through a non-
agricultural household income multiplier of almost unity. This means that non-
agricultural households benefited by the same amount as the increased value of
agricultnral exports. In this way the economy was able to sustain a 3 per cent real
growth rate all through the recession though part of this must be attributed to the
success of industrial promotion.
An indication of the benefits to the non-farm sector lies in the fact that
Government transfers were the fastest growing source of income in real terms
between 1973 and 1977 at + 29.1 per cent. The remuneration of employees in
sectors otller than manufacturing mad farming was the second fastest at 15 per cent.*
I~[anufacturing wages grew 13.2 per cent whereas the real increase in agricul~re
was only 5.1 per cent. Admittedly comparison with 1973 in the latter case overlooks
the highly favourable prices obtaining in 1973. The expansion of administrative,
professional andservice employment was facilitated by the successful export record
of agriculture and welfare transfers also benefited from the same cause. This is
the income-enhancing effect of the EEC referred to earlier.
Attavood had difficulty in defining consumers in a way that d~fered from
the community as a whole or from the non-agricultural community already discussed.
He found the idea of the non-fanning community viewed solely as food purchasers
an unrealistic split Of roles. However, addressing himself to the concept he asked
what the price support for Irish agriculture would have been in the absence of
membership and how it would have affected domestic prices. He concluded that
it could well have been as large, or larger. Speaking of the 70 per cent increase
* The price index for services grew faster than that for food.
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in support prices due to the green pound devaluations between October 1974 and
1978 he noted that their combined effect was to add about 7 per cent to the Consumer
Price Index since entry.
General. Prosperity
To summarise Attwood’s analysis it is clear that the Republic of Ireland
has been enjoying an immense change during tt~e seventies. Part of this growth has
been due to the successful promotional activities of the IDA which have had the
sympathy of Brussels. Part must also be attributed to the gains of the Common
Agricultural Policy. These gains would be regarded more as a movement towards
a realistic export price regime away from the depressed trading conditions obtaining
previously rather than a bonus over and above good prices. The consequences have
been a general air of progress pervading the country, with new houses being built
everywhere and areas long marked by rural decline experiencing return _flows and
rising marriage and birth rates. Some part of this success story must be due to
the multiplier effects of the CAP since farmers at the height of their prosperity were
not called on to make a large direct contribution to income redistribution within
Ireland. Given the appropriate taxation regime th.e gains from CAP could have been
used to further internal redistribution. At present the gains are much smaller
m~d the opportunity largely missed.
What o~ the future? Now that the harmonisation of national price is
completed, future price rises will come from mmua[ negotiations and from currency
depreciation. Let us take them. in that sequence.
for three major commodities has been as follows:
The history of annual price changes
Change over previous year: Cattle Milk Barley
1973/4 10.5 4.5 1.0
1974/5 18.6 13.1 4.9
1975/6 5.5 I0.9 9.4
1976/7 7.5 5.1 4.5
1977/8 , 3.5 3.1 3.5
1978/9 2.5 I. 9 i. 3
1979/80 1.5 - 1.5
198011 1.5 1.2 2.0
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The table would indicate that; expressed in units of account, the era of large
ammal price increases is over. The large increases in 1974/5 were to compensate
farmers for the disastrous fall in incomes following the oil crisis due to increase
in input costs. This can be illustrated by Irish fertiliser prices.
1972 1973 1974 1975
N 4.95 5.30 7.90 10.60
1) 6.65 7.28 15.40 23.40
K 2.04 2.28 3.53 5.36
Source: John A. Comlolly (1975) Table A. 11.
The price increase projected for milk does not take into account the proposed large
co-responsibility levy for extra production. The view would seem to be that the
farmers’ relative position will be eroded over time and the margin of protection
diminish; Indeed such a development, ff properly programmed, could be in the
Iong-tel~n interests of efficient full-time producers such as those of the UK and
Ireland. A number of measures currently under discussion would help in this
direction. At the same time, the consumer would benefit. There has been some
movement towards freer trade in the provision made for New Zealand produce and
sugar and beef imports from ACP countries. Further liberalisation is most likely
to benefit North American producers rather than those of the Third World. Such
liberalisation should take place in the context of a general liberalisation, also
agreed by the US m~d Japan so that world prices reflect more closely comparative
advan.£age. It should also be noted that the different patterns of trade currently,
the new exchange rates and the higher prices for primary products since the late
’sixties mean that m~ attempt by Britain to revert to the old system of deficiency
payments is unlikely to be successful even if the taxpayer was prepared to shoulder
the cost° It should also be noted that cheap food will not overcome the problem of
competitivity. In the mid-’seventies food in Britain was about 40 per cent cheaper
thm] in Germany, but, according to the cambridge Economic Policy Group, this
factor did not appear to help .British exports. The answer lies in a large
reinvcstment programme such as that which France completed successfully.
In July 1977 ’~Thich" magazine published an account of the amounts of
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surplus commodities in terms of daily consumption rates. For barley and sugar
it was 2 days, 20 days for beef and veal, 37 days for wine and 61 days for butter,
but this was ,’flier subsidised exports had occurred. This helps to put the "mountains"
and "lakes" in perspective. Given the nature of farm production some buffer stocks
are clearly an advmltage but are also less vital in a situation of perpetual surplus.
The case for warding off the increased production is clear but would be best achieved
in a situation that enables the consumer to benefit from the efficiency of the best
producers. The present situation does not permit comparative advantage to operate.
In terms of inflation the real bogey is the future of file exchange rate
and what the EEC can do to strengthen the economies experiencing difficulties.
It is generally recognised (e. g., McDougall report) that European integration ealmot
proceed unless there is provided some mechanism for solving this problem. At
present the dominant view within seems to be that of total free trade with consumer
A
lobbies advocating that this be extended also to agriculture. Irish history should
warn of the consequences of strict adherence to Manchester liberalism. The Act
of Union ushered in a brief period of agricultural prosperity followed by farm price
collapse and the rapid dismantling of the industrial gains of Grattan’s parliament.
Belfast, as the then second city of the Empire, gained at that time it is true, but
Belfast no longer holds such an enviable position. The strong centres of the
contemporary scene are almost all in continental Europe and in Germany in particular.
It is of no benefit to the consumer to promote lower prices through general free
trade if, like in the great Irish Famine, he has no income by which to avail of these
prices. Free trade by all means but let’s have a regime of free trade that in
additionprovides the means for ailing areas to recover and for preindustriai areas
to retain their populations. The British and Irish consumer, fllerefore, has a
vested interest in mechanisms by which stlxlcture re-organisation can be promoted.
Given Such a re-organisation and stronger currencies the impact of food prices
would be of less concern. This was essentially the British government’s point of
view at the time of accession. Now, however, the arg~lment has veered to suggest
that the money at present going to farm subsidies should be spent instead on regional
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programmes in the UK, Italy and Ireland. In the long run the Irish interest
(both producer and consumer) could coincide with that stance. There are, however,
a number of political problems which would make the Irish government nervous
¯ about trusting to such a switch over. At present the CAP acts as a surrogate
regional fund in the I~epublie and boner.its are reaped in two ways. First, there
are the actual EEC transfers. Under the CAP these funds are available without
any requirement of matching finance from the Irish exchequer and they are paid
automatically without political intervention in ~heir allocation. No other transfers
share these characteristics. Second, the transfers themselves are only part o£
the story. Other inflows occur through enhanced prices paid by forei,Tn and local
consumers. Given tllat Ireland’s share of both CAP and the l~egional Fund are
¯ broadly similar a mechanism which maintained the same level of inflows but
allocated them under the Regional Fund could have distinct advantages for Irish
development. However, the political debate on CAP tends to obscure the fact
that in terms of transfers the size of the total EEC budget is very small -- roughly
the same proportion 0£ EEC GNP as that fraction of GNP suggested as a target
by the United Nations for helping the development of the Third World. Compared
to the fraction of GNP passing through the coffers of individual State exchequers
the ~unds available to Brussels are very small. As matters stand at present the
Republic is getting support via a quasi-regional fund - CAP and its efforts to
industrialise have had o~fictal blessing at Brussels, mainly because the country
is small and the concession hurt few people. If Northern Ireland was independent
such an arrangement could also be made but the extension of these facilities to
the UK as a whole at present would meet political opposition in Europe. In the
outcome of these concessions the consumers’ i1~terests in the I~epublic have been
served to a considerable extent; but it is diEficult to see the same situation conthming
much into the future m~d especially after further enlargement.
20.
Appendix
Price equations from IVicCarthy
Change in Consumer Prices net of taxes and subsidies (Pt)
Pt = 1.672 + .098mt + .260 I~t_l + ’495 Xt
(. 442) (. 064)    (. 124)       (. Ii0)
Eq. 9 (2)
standard errors
R2 = .927 D.W.    2.36 d.f = 16
Change in Export Prices (Xt) Eq. II.
B
Xt = .313 + .049 1t + .355 ft
(. 610) (. 165)    (. 049)
+ .404mt
(. 055)
÷ .202 l~nt _ 1
(. 198)    standard errors
p2 = .944 D.W. = 1.81 d.f = 15
Combined equations
p ¯ ¯
Pt = 1. 827 + .298 r~t + °360 1~t_l + 0.176ft + "0241t
All variables are price indices
m = import
f = farm
1 = unit labour costs
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